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EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
AMENDMENTS OF 1991: CONGRESS PROTECTS U.S.
CITIZENS WHO WORK FOR U.S. COMPANIES ABROAD
1.

INTRODUCTION

On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 into law. 1 The new Act is the most extensive civil rights
legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The new Act's goal is to
"amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional
employment discrimination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate
impact actions, and for other purposes."'
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reverses seven United States Supreme Court decisions.4 One Supreme Court decision that the Act

1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991). More specifically, the Act lists the following
purposes:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace; (2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to
confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[citation omitted]; and (4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.

Id. § 3.
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed the following cases: EEOC v. Arabian
Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (see infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991) (prevailing party can not
recover fees for expert services in civil rights litigation); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (§ 1981 which prohibits race discrimination in the "making and enforcement of contracts," is limited to hiring and promotion cases); Lorance
v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (the time period to challenge a seniority policy as
discriminatory begins when the employer approves the policy); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (white firefighters can challenge a consent decree entered into years
earlier mandating minority hiring); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that a specific employment
policy or practice resulted in a disparate impact, the employer only has the burden to
explain how the disparate practice or policy serves a legitimate goal); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (even if the employer took plaintiff's protected class
into account, the employer can avoid liability by proving that it would have treated the

(147)
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reverses is EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),8 which held
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply to American
citizens who work for American companies abroad. 6 In Aramco, the
Supreme Court held that based on the presumption against extraterritoriality, Congress did not provide the clear and expressed intent to
apply Title VII extraterritorially. 7 By adding a new section entitled
"Protection of Extraterritorial Employment" to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, Congress has now provided the clear and expressed intent to apply
Title VII extraterritorially 8
This comment analyzes the 1991 extraterritorial amendments to
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Part II discusses the development of the rule
of statutory construction that requires federal courts to presume
against applying a federal statute extraterritorially. In addition, Part II
discusses how the Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in Aramco. Part III discusses the "Extraterritorial Employment Protection Amendments." Specifically, this part examines the
legislative history and the language of the extraterritorial amendments
that Congress added to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Finally, Part IV
suggests the potential consequences of the extraterritorial amendments.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE

1964 CIvIL RIGHTS ACT
A.

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

Traditionally, a rule of construction for ambiguous statutes required a presumption against applying a federal statute extraterritorially.9 Courts presumed that a federal statute applied only in the United
States unless Congress clearly intended the statute to have extraterritorial application. 1"
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co." was the first case that
required the Supreme Court to determine if a federal statute could be

plaintiff in the same manner if it did not take the plaintiff's protected class into
account).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).

6. Id. at 1229.
7. Id. at 1230-36.
8. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
9. See Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339, 344 (1990).
10. See id.
11. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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applied extraterritorially.'2 American Banana Co. involved a monopoly
formed by the defendant, United Fruit Co., over the banana trade in
Costa Rica. 13 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes held that the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not apply to monopolies outside of the
1
-United States even though both parties were American corporations. 4
Holmes reasoned that "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.' ' 1 5 The strict rule of construction set forth by Holmes required that courts construe statutes to

be "confined in [their] operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.'' Otherwise,
according to Holmes, the court's action of extending a statute extraterritorially would violate the international law principle of sovereign
power.17

Holmes's rigid canon of construction remained precedent until the
early 1930s when courts began to allow some statutes to apply beyond
the territory of the United States.' 8 Instead of a strict presumption

against applying a statute extraterritorially, courts began to form a rule
that created a rebuttable presumption against applying a statute extraterritorially.' 9 For example, in Blackmer v. United States, 0 the Supreme Court had to determine whether the Walsh Act 2 rebutted the
presumption that the Act could not be applied extraterritorially 2 Be-

12. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome".- Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 603 (1990) [herein-

after Turley].
13. American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 354.

14. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 356.
16. Id. at 357.
17. See id. at 356; see also Turley, supra note 12, at 607.

18. Turley, supra note 12, at 604-05.
19. Id. at 605.
20. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783-1784 (1988). The Walsh Act applies to citizens who are
required to give testimony in a criminal trial but neglect to do so. In 1932, the Act
explicitly stated that:
Whenever the attendance at the trial of any criminal action of a witness, being a citizen of the United States or domiciled therein, who is beyond the
jurisdiction of the United States, is desired by the Attorney General .

.

. the

judge of the court before which such action is pending... may ... order that
a subpoena issue .

.

. commanding such witness to appear before the said

court at a time and place therein designated.
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 433 n.l.
22. Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437.
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cause Congress explicitly authorized the application of the statute in a
foreign country, the Court held that the statute could be applied extraterritorially.2 3 In Blackmer, the Court focused on Congressional intent
that a statute could not be applied
to rebut the presumption
24
extraterritorially.
In Foley Bros., Inc. v Filardo,25 however, the Supreme Court once
again applied the rigid presumption against applying a federal statute
extraterritorially. In Foley Bros., the Court had to determine whether
the Federal Eight Hour Law 28 could be applied extraterritorially.2 The
defendant, Foley Bros., entered into a contract with the United States
to build certain public works in Iraq and Iran.2 ' The defendant hired
the plaintiff, Filardo, as a cook on the construction site.2 9 The contract
between the parties contained no provision regarding overtime hours.30
Filardo often worked more than eight hours a day, but Foley Bros. refused his request for -overtime pay.3 1 As a result, Filardo filed suit
against Foley Bros. claiming that the Eight Hour Law entitled him to
overtime pay.3 2 The jury found for Filardo and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed.3 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
34
determine the scope of the Eight Hour Law.
In Foley Bros., the Supreme Court recognized that Congress had
the power to extend a federal act extraterritorially. 35 The Court had to
determine, however, whether Congress actually intended for the Eight
Hour Law to apply extraterritorially. 36 To reach its conclusion, the
Court set forth two basic premises. Adopting the first premise from
Blackmer, the Court noted "the canon of construction which teaches

23. Id.
24. See Turley, supra note 12, at 606. Contra American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (strict presumption against extraterritoriality).
25. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
26. 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326. The Eight Hour Law provided that "[e]very contract
made to which the United States . . .is a party . . . shall contain a provision that no
laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by the contract ... shall
be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon
Id. § 324. Congress repealed this law on August 13, 1962.
...
such work.
27. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 282.
28. Id.at 283.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 280.
35. Id. at 284.

36. Id. at 285.
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that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."87
In support of this first premise, the second premise provided that "Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions." 8 Upon applying these standards to the Eight Hour Law, the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend for the Act to apply extraterritorially.3 9
Foley Bros. set the precedent that the presumption against apply-

ing a statute extraterritorially was the canon of statutory construction
that a court must apply when faced with an extraterritorial question.
The reasoning behind Foley Bros.' presumption against extraterritoriality, however, was not the same as that in American Banana Co.4 As
stated above, in American Banana Co., the Court reasoned that applying American law extraterritorially would result in a violation of international law. 4 In Foley Bros., however, the Court did not hold that
extending American law extraterritorially would result in such a violation.4 2 Instead, Foley Bros. merely created a rule of statutory

construction. 3
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,"
the Supreme Court once again explicitly addressed the potential for
violation of international law if courts applied American law extraterritorially.45 In McCulloch, the Court had to determine if the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 46 extended beyond the territories of the

37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. The Court found no language in the Eight Hour Law that showed any
congressional intent to extend the Act extraterritorially. Id. The Court also found no
congressional intent in the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 286. Instead, the Court
noted that Congress passed the Act because of its concern for domestic labor condi-

tions. Id.
40. See Turley, supra note 12, at 607.
41. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
42. See Turley, supra note 12, at 607. Turley indicates, however, that the presumption set forth in Foley Bros. seems to be as strict as the one set forth in American
Banana Co.

43. Id.
44. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
45. Id. at 21-22; see also Turley, supra note 12 at 607 n.66.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 151. The purpose of the NLRA is to prevent "the inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not posses full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract" because this inequality "substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing powers of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries." Id.

152 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 16
United States.4 7 The Court held that the NLRA does not extend to the
maritime duties of alien seamen employed by foreign-flag vessels."8 The
Court first recognized that Congress has the power to extend the
NLRA beyond the United States territories."9 The Court, however, had
to determine if Congress actually exercised this power. 50 In making its
determination, the Court addressed the international rule that "the flag
state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship." 51 The Court
held, therefore, that before it extended an American law extraterritorially and disturbed the "delicate field of international relations," the
Court required "an affirmative intention of Congress clearly
'52
expressed."
B.

EEOC v. Aramco: No ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

Before the Supreme Court decided Aramco, most of the federal
district courts applied Title VII extraterritorially. 53 In addition, commentators analyzed the language of Title VII as permitting the statute
to apply extraterritorially. 5" In Aramco, however, the Supreme Court
held that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially to American citizens

47. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12. This case involved foreign subsidiaries owned by
United Fruit Company, an American company. Id. The foreign subsidiaries each
owned sea vessels that carried a foreign crew and flew a foreign flag. Id. The National
Maritime Union of American represented unlicensed seamen employed by Honduranflagged vessels. Id. at 13. The union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) on behalf of the seamen. Id. The NLRB claimed that the NLRA extended to these foreign seamen. Id. at 12.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)).
53. See, e.g., Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp 590 (D. Md. 1986)
(Title VII applies extraterritorially); Bryrant v. Int'l Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472
(D.N.J. 1982) (Title VII applies extraterritorially); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 F.E.P.
423 (D. Colo. 1976) (Congress intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially). But see
Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (no clear congressional intent
to apply Title VII extraterritorially), affid 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), af'd, 892
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990)(en banc), affd sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
54. See Lairold M. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employees in the United States and Abroad, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.,
357, 363 (1987) [hereinafter Street].
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who work for American companies abroad. 55
1. Facts of EEOC v. Aramco
The plaintiff, Ali Boureslan, was born in Lebanon and became a
naturalized United States citizen. 56 The defendants, Arabian American
Oil Company (Aramco) and its subsidiary, Aramco Service Company
(ASC), were Delaware corporations.5 7 Aramco and ASC's principal
place of business was Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and Houston, Texas re58
spectively. Aramco was also licensed to do business in Texas.
In 1979, ASC hired Boureslan as a cost engineer in its Houston
office. 59 In 1980, ASC transferred Boureslan, upon his request, to work
with Aramco in Saudi Arabia.6 0 While working for Aramco, Boureslan
and his superior engaged in numerous arguments that ultimately led to
Boureslan's termination.6" According to Boureslan, the arguments resulted from his employer's continued harassment, which included racial, religious and ethnic slurs. 62
As a result of his discharge, Boureslan filed a discrimination
charge against Aramco with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 6 3 Boureslan also filed suit against Aramco and ASC
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
based on the alleged discriminatory treatment that he received while
working for Aramco in Saudi Arabia. 4 Boureslan sought relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as under state law. 65
Aramco and ASC both filed summary judgment motions to dismiss Boureslan's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6 6 The defendants claimed that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction because Title VII does not apply to United States citizens
who work for United States companies abroad. 7 The district court

55. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1229.
56. Id. at 1229-30.
57. Id. at 1230.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd 892 F.2d
1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S.
Ct. 1227 (1991).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
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granted Aramco and ASC's motions and a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 68 The Fifth Circuit subsequently vacated the panel's decision and
reheard the case en banc.6 9 Upon its rehearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Boureslan's claim. 70 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both Boureslan and the EEOC in
order to resolve the issue of whether Title VII protects United States
citizens who work for United States companies abroad. 1
2.

Supreme Court's Reasoning

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first recognized
that "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. ' 72 Thus, the Court's objective was
to determine through statutory construction whether Congress intended
to apply Title VII extraterritorially. 7' Rehnquist adopted the strict rule
of statutory construction from Foley Bros. that "'legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
According to Rehnthe territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'
quist, this rule "serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord." '75 Renhquist determined that the Court must look at the express language of Title VII to determine whether Congress intended
Title VII to-apply extraterritorially.7 1 In making its determination, the
Court must "assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 17 7 In addition, the Court
must assume that Congress is predominately concerned with domestic
78
conditions, unless Congress clearly expresses a contrary intent.
",74

The majority applied this strict canon of construction to two parts
of the statute. First, the majority determined whether the statute de-

68. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1015.
69. Boureslan v. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), afl'd sub nom. EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
70. Id. at 1272.
71. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
72. Id.; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949).
73. Aramco, Il1 S. Ct. at 1230.
74. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
75. Id.; see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963).
76. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1230.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
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broad

enough to include United States companies that hire United States citizens abroad.79 Second, the majority determined whether the statute's
"alien exemption" clause demonstrated that Congress intended to pro-

tect U.S. citizens who worked for U.S. companies abroad. 80
The Court rejected both Boureslan's and Aramco's interpretations
of Title VII's
definitions of "employer," "affecting commerce" and
"commerce." 8 1 Instead, the Court held that by using the same language in Title VII to define "commerce" as Congress used in other
statutes that did not apply extraterritorially, Congress did not intend
Title VII to extend extraterritorially.82 Furthermore, the Court found
no evidence in case law that broad definitions of "commerce," includ-

79. Id., 111 S.Ct. at 1230-31. Title VII defines employer as "a person engaged in
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees." 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(b). The statute defines an industry affecting commerce as:
[A]ny activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute
would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes
any activity or industry 'affecting commerce' with-in the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, and further includes
any governmental industry, business or activity.
Id. § 2000(e)(h). Finally, Title VII defines commerce as "trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a
State and any place outside thereof; or within the District of Columbia, or a possession
of the United States; or between points in the same State but through a point outside
thereof." Id. § 2000(e)(g).
80. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. at 1231. The "alien exemption" states: "[T]his subchapter
shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
state." Id. § 2000(e-1).
81. Petitioners asserted that Title VII's "broad jurisdictional language" illustrated
Congress' intent to apply the statute extraterritorially. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3,
EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991) (Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. More specifically, petitioners asserted that Congress intended for the
clause "between a State and any place thereof" to refer to areas outside of the territorial limits of the United States. Id. Respondents, however, argued that the clause "or
between a State and any place outside thereof" "provide[s] the jurisdictional nexus
required to regulate commerce that is not wholly within a single state, presumably as it
affects both interstate and foreign commerce" instead of regulating "conduct exclusively within a foreign country." Id. at 21 n.14 (emphasis in original). Respondents also
argued that none of the statute's definitions refer to "commerce with foreign nations."
Id. Lastly, respondents contended that because the Senate deleted the terms "foreign
commerce" and "foreign nations" before it passed the Act, Congress clearly intended
that Title VII not extend to protect U.S. citizens that worked for U.S. companies
abroad. Id.
82. EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1232 (1991); see, e.g., Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(12); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 321(b); Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1802(1).
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ing those that mention "foreign commerce," have ever been held to apply extraterritorially.8 3 Finally, the Court stated that "if we were to
permit possible, or even plausible interpretations of language such as
that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial
application, there would be little left of the presumption."8 The Court,
therefore, affirmed its prior holding that the strict rule of construction
for determining whether a federal statute applies extraterritorially requires a presumption against extraterritoriality.
The Court also rejected Boureslan's argument that the alien exemption provision 8" "clearly manifests an intention" by Congress to apply Title VII extraterritorially.86 Boureslan had argued that by drawing
a negative inference from the language of the "alien exemption provision," Congress clearly intended Title VII to be applied extraterritorially.8 7 The Court held, however, that Boureslan's interpretation of the
"alien exemption provision" offered no means to distinguish between
United States employers and foreign employers.8 8 The Court reasoned
that Boureslan's interpretation would absurdly result in subjecting a
foreign employer of a United States citizen in a foreign country to Title
VII. 8 9 Because this result could potentially cause international discord,
the Court required a clearer indication that Congress intended to subject Title VII to foreign companies in foreign countries than that pro-

83. Aramco, Ill S. Ct. at 1232; see, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268
U.S. 29 (1925) (no specific language indicated congressional intent to apply the Federal Employers Liability Act extraterritorially even though the statute conferred jurisdiction for cases involving foreign commerce); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (no specific language indicating congressional intent to apply the National Labor Relations Act overseas even though the statute broadly defines "commerce").
84. Aramco, Ill S. Ct. at 1233.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-1).
86. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 81; at 12-13.
87. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1233. In his brief, Boureslan stated that there is "[no]
other plausible explanation [that] the alien exemption exists .... [Ihf Congress believed that the statute did not apply extraterritorially, it would have had no reason to
include an exemption for a certain category of individuals employed outside the United
States." Petitioner's Brief, supra note 81, at 12-13. Boureslan further argued that
"Congress could not rationally have enacted an exemption for the employment of aliens
abroad if it intended to foreclose all potential extraterritorial applications of the statute." Id. On the other hand, Aramco argued that Congress intended the provision to
exempt aliens from the areas outside of the United States but still within the United
States control. Brief for Respondents at 27, EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
Aramco also argued that drawing a negative inference from the "alien exemption provision" only "confirm[s] the coverage of aliens in the United States." Id. at 26.
88. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1234.
89. Id.
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vided by the "alien exemption provision." 90 In support of its holding,

the Court presented further evidence that the alien exemption provision
did not provide a clear intent by Congress to apply Title VII extraterritorially. The Court indicated that Title VII primarily had a domestic
focus. 91 The Court also indicated that the statute did not set forth the
method by which Title VII would be enforced abroad.9 Finally, the
Court reasoned that, if Congress intended Title VII to protect U.S.
employees abroad, "it would have addressed the subject of conflicts

with foreign laws and procedures." 93
In its final point, the Court acknowledged that "[w]hen it desires

to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute."9' 4 Congress' understanding of extraterritorial
application of U.S. statutes is evidenced in various provisions that expressly extend jurisdictional reach extraterritorially.9 5 The Court,
therefore, stated that "Congress, should it wish to do so, may . . .
amend Title VII and in doing so will be able to calibrate its provisions

in a way that we cannot." 9'
3. Justice Marshall's Dissent
In his di ssent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's in-

terpretation of the rule of statutory construction for determining
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court noted various provisions that the statute should not unreasonably interfere with state sovereignty or state laws. Id. Furthermore, the Court indicated
that Title VII constantly referred to "States," but never mentioned foreign nations or
foreign procedures. Id.
92. Id. The Court used Title VII's venue provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3),
and the limited enforcement power of the EEOC to demonstrate that the statute did
not provide any means to enforce the statute overseas. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1235 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)).
95. Id.; see, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2415(2)
(defining "United States person" as "any domestic establishment of any domestic concern (including any permanent domestic establishment of any foreign concern) and any
foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of any
domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern"); Logan Act,
18 U.S.C. § 953 (applies the Act to "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he
may be .... ").
96. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236. The Court stated that if Congress wanted Title
VII to apply extraterritorially, Congress should amend the Act as it did in 1984 for the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621. Id. For a discussion on the extraterritorial amendment to the ADEA, see infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
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whether a statute has extraterritorial reach.9" According to Marshall,
the rule "is not a 'clear statement' rule . . . [r]ather, as our case law
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality well illustrates, a

court may properly rely on this presumption only after exhausting all
of the traditional tools 'whereby unexpressed congressional intent may
be ascertained.' "98 By applying this canon of construction to Title VII,
Marshall concluded that Congress did intend to apply Title VII protection to American citizens who work for American companies abroad. 99
Marshall analyzed the same provisions of Title VII as those analyzed by the majority. 100 First, Marshall reasoned that the statute defined the terms "employer" and "commerce" broadly enough to include
United States employers abroad. 01 Second, Marshall reasoned that by

negative inference, the "alien-exemption provision" indicated Congress'
intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially. "2
Following his analysis of these two provisions, Marshall discussed
the other points addressed by the majority. Marshall argued that during the hearings for the alien exemption provision, Congress did address the issue of conflicts with foreign law. 08 Marshall also argued
that Title VII's venue provisions, which state that "an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the [employer] has his
principal office," would extend to any United States employer doing

97. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id.; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (a court
cannot apply the presumption against extraterritoriality until it has used all other factors that determine Congressional intent).
99. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1240.
101. Id. As Justice Marshall stated:
Nothing in the text of the statute indicates that the protection of an "individual" from employment discrimination depends on the location of that individual's workplace; nor does anything in the statute indicate that employers
whose businesses affect commerce "between a State and any other place
outside thereof" are exempted when their discriminatory conduct occurs beyond the Nation's borders.
Id.
102. Id. at 1240-41. Justice Marshall based his conclusion on the legislative history of the alien exemption provision, which states:
In section 4 of the Act, a limited exception is provided for employers with
respect to employment of aliens outside of any State .... The intent of/this]
exemption is to remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between
the United States and a foreign nation in the employment of aliens outside
the United States by an American enterprise.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963)) (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 1243. For an explanation of the legislative history of the "alien exemption provision," see supra note 102.
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business abroad. 10 Finally, although not addressed by the majority,
Marshall argued that the extraterritorial application of Title VII is
supported by various administrative interpretations such as those by the
EEOC and the Justice Department. 10 5
4.

Consequences of the Majority's Decision

The majority's decision in Aramco produced many troublesome
consequences and left many questions unanswered. For instance, can an
American company avoid a lawsuit in America by transferring a female American employee who asked for maternity leave to its foreign
office and then fire her? What if she goes on a business trip abroad and
is sexually harassed? What about other federal statutes that do not
expressly apply extraterritorially? Will these statutes also fail to protect American citizens overseas?
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Aramco, commentators quickly reacted to the decision's impact on American workers abroad." ° ' The main criticism focused on the unprotected two million Americans who work overseas for American companies."0 7
Fortunately, Congress quickly reacted to the Aramco decision and provided clear answers to the questions that. the Court raised in its
decision.
III.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION

AMENDMENTS OF

1991

As stated above, on November 21, 1991, President Bush signed
the 1991 Civil Rights Act into law. Section 109 of the Act contains the
These
"Extraterritorial Employment Protection Amendments." '18'
amendments clearly and expressly extend the protection of Title VII to
United States citizens who work for United States companies abroad.
Congress followed the Supreme Court's suggestion and demonstrated
clear and expressed intent to apply the Act extraterritorially. In so doing, Congress reversed Aramco.

104. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)).
105. Id. at 1244-45.
106. See generally Joy Cherian, Losing Job ProtectionAbroad, J. OF COM., Apr.
5, 1991, at 4A; Gary Born & W. Hardy Callcott, When Basic Rights Stop at the
Border, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at 26-27 [hereinafter Born & Callcott]. David
Barbash, InternationalDecisions: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1991) [hereinafter Barbash].
107. Born & Callcott, supra note 106, at 27; Barbash, supra note 106, at 557.
108. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 109 (1991).
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A.

Legislative History of the ExtraterritorialAmendments to
Title VII

On May 29, 1991, Representative Kweisi Mfume of Maryland tes10 9
tified in front of the House of Representative's Committee on Rules.
In his testimony, Mfume expressed his concern over the Supreme
Court's decision in Aramco."0 Mfume testified that he "d[id] not believe that Congress intended to leave a whole category of American
workers unprotected." ' Consequently, Mfume drafted the extraterritorial amendments to the Civil Rights Act." 2 Arguing for his proposed
amendments, Mfume stated:
[I]nformation I have obtained estimated that there are 2.2 million private sector employees and about 140,514 federal government employees abroad. This is clearly too large of a number to
leave unprotected by [T]itle VII and I earnestly hope that we
can make haste and close the issue of whether Congress in11
tended for [T]itle VII to apply extraterritorially. 3
The legislative history of Title VII's extraterritorial amendments is
based largely on the legislative history of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's (ADEA)' 4 extraterritorial amendments. Originally,
the ADEA's language did not explicitly express Congress' intent to apply the statute extraterritorially." 5 The Older American Act Amendments of 1984, however, amended the ADEA to allow extraterritorial
protection for older workers abroad." 6 In order to understand the legislative history behind Title VII's extraterritorial amendments, therefore,
an examination of the legislative history of the ADEA's extraterritorial
amendments is necessary.
The circuit court decisions in Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc. 17
and Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co."18 motivated Congress to extend

109. Extraterritorial Employment Protection Amendment of 1991: Hearing
Before the House Committee on Rules, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of
Rep. Mfume).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2.
112. Id.at 3.
113. Id.at 4.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. 728 F.2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984).
118. 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984).
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the ADEA extraterritorially. In Cleary, United States Lines, an American company, employed Cleary for thirty-three years." 9 Beginning in
1967, and until his termination in June 1967, Cleary worked for the
company in London, England. 2 ' United States Lines first claimed that
it fired Cleary because of structural reorganization, but later claimed
that Cleary's job performance was unsatisfactory.' 2 As a result of his
termination, Cleary filed an age discrimination claim with the EEOC
and filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The district court held that because the ADEA utilizes the
enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
because the FLSA explicitly does not extend extraterritorially, the
ADEA also does not apply extraterritorially 22 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. 2 3
In Zahourek, Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young) employed
Zahourek, an American citizen, as a certified public accountant in its
South Vietnam office.12 1 In 1978, Arthur Young transferred Zahourek
to Honduras where it ultimately fired him in 1981.125 Zahourek filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
alleging that Arthur Young terminated his employment because of his
age. "2' 6 The district court held, however, that the ADEA does not apply
extraterritorially. 27 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision. 2 '
On September 23, 1983, the Subcommittee on Aging of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the United States Senate
held a hearing regarding age discrimination and overseas Americans. 29

Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), chairperson of the Subcommittee,
opened the hearing by stating:

119. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 607.
120. Id.at 608.
121. Id.

122.
728 F.2d
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
750 F.2d
128.

Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), affd,
607 (3d Cir. 1984).
Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610.
Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828 (10th Cir. 1984).

Id.
Id. When Arthur Young fired him, Zahourek was 43 years old. Id.
Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Colo. 1983), afd,
827 (10th Cir. 1984).
Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 829.

129. Age Discrimination and Overseas, 1983: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1983).
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This year, the U.S. district courts of New Jersey and Colorado
have opened up a major loophole which I believe could seriously
threaten the protection under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 . . . While I congratulate the judges for
judicial restraint uncharacteristic of many of their colleagues, I
cannot agree that Congress would ever have intended either to
leave out a whole class of American employees or to leave such
a large loophole ... [W]ithout action by this committee and by
Congress many more older American workers will find themselves out in the cold with the shelter provided by the Age Dis-

crimination in Employment Act. 130

The remainder of the hearing consisted of comments from various
speakers who expressed their professional
opinions regarding the stat131

ute's extraterritorial amendment.

Justice Clarence Thomas, then chairperson of the EEOC, provided
the subcommittee with the EEOC's position on the extraterritorial
amendment.1 32 The EEOC agreed with the two district courts' reasoning that the ADEA, as written, did not apply extraterritorially.1 33 The
EEOC supported its conclusion by comparing the language of the
ADEA with that of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."" Accord-

130. Id. (opening statement of Senator Grassley, Chairman of the Subcomm.).
131. Id. at 2-48. Hon. Clarence Thomas, Chairperson of EEOC, testified on
EEOC's position regarding the extraterritorial application of ADEA. See infra notes
132-37 and accompanying text. Steven Kartzman, attorney for Mr. Cleary, see supra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text, testified that although he felt that the ADEA did
have extraterritorial reach, "[C]ongress clearly has the ability to give a statute extraterritorial reach." Age Discrimination and Overseas, 1983: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1983) (statement of Mr. Steven Kartzman). Eugene Goodman, author and
business executive, testified that Congress should extend Title VII extraterritorially,
but he also advocated for extending the time of the filing period at least one year from
the time of the alleged violation or from the time the American returns to the United
States. Id. at 18 (statement of Mr. Eugene Goodman). William Yoffe, Executive Director of American Citizens Abroad, testified regarding the need for legislation to assure that Title VII will protect American citizens abroad. Id. at 23 (statement of Mr.
William Yoffe). Thomas Shea, general counsel for United States Lines, see supra notes
123-127 and accompanying text, testified that an extraterritorial amendment to Title
VII would be "impossible to implement and to perform." Id. at 40 (statement of Mr.
Thomas Shea). In addition, letters were submitted from William F. Cagney, Director
of Industrial Relations and Management Resources, Dennis Dowdell, Jr., American
Lane, and Paul J. Ostling, Associate General Counsel of Arthur Young & Co.
132. Id. at 2-4 (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairperson, EEOC).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id.
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ing to the EEOC, the "alien exemption provision" extended Title VII
beyond the territorial borders of the United States. 3 " However, the
ADEA contained no such language. 3 6 Arguing that the ADEA should
have extraterritorial reach, Thomas stated:
It can be argued that the ADEA should be amended to provide
extraterritorial coverage to Americans working in foreign countries for American companies. This is underscored by [T]itle
VII's extraterritorial application and the long-recognized fact
that the purposes and goals of the two statutes are parallel, that
is, to eliminate discrimination in employment. The only way to
make the two laws consistent and insure that other individual's
do not find themselves in Mr. Cleary's situation in the future is
to enact legislation such as that proposed by Chairman
Grassley to close the existing loophole.' 3 7
Thomas' testimony demonstrated EEOC's long-standing opinion
that the original Title VII had extraterritorial application."3 8 Ironically,
the Court in Aramco could have used Thomas' reasoning when deciding whether to extend Title VII extraterritorially, i.e., because the
amended ADEA has extraterritorial application and because the "purpose and goals of the two statutes are parallel," Title VII also should
have extraterritorial application.
The ADEA's extraterritorial amendment,, therefore, provided the
background for Title VII's extraterritorial amendment. Congress held
no additional hearings to assess the advantages and disadvantages of
extending Title VII extraterritorially. During the debate on the 1991
Civil Rights Act, Representative William Goodling (R-Pa.) expressed
his concern for the lack of hearings on the extraterritorial issue.139
Goodling stated that the amendment:
is consistent with the position of the administration before the
Supreme Court, but once again, a far-reaching change in employment discrimination law is being undertaken with no pretense of substantive consideration in the legislative process ...
hearings on an issue of this importance - extension of an Ameri-

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 81, at 22.
139. 137 CONG. REC. 85, H3934 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Goodling).
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can law to other countries and all the potential problems that
may entail - would have been useful.140

B.

Language of the ExtraterritorialAmendment

In his amendments, Mfume used the same language that Congress
used to amend the ADEA."' As stated above, the Older Americans
Act of 1984 contained the amendments to the ADEA. The Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources' report on the Older
Americans Act Amendments of 1984 explained the reasoning behind
the language of the ADEA's extraterritorial amendment:"4 2
When considering this amendment, the Committee was cognizant of the well-established principle of sovereignty, that no nation has the right to impose its labor standards on another
country. That is why the amendment is carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who are working for
U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. It does not apply to foreign nationals working for such corporations in a foreign workplace and it does not apply to foreign companies which are not
controlled by U.S. firms. Moreover, it is the intent of the committee that this amendment not be enforced where the compliance with its prohibitions would place a U.S. company or its
subsidiary in violation of the laws of the host country."4 3

of
to
in
of

Section 109 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains the "Protection
Extraterritorial Employments Amendments.""' Section 109(a) adds
the end of the definition of employee, "with respect to employment
a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen
the United States."" 5 Section 109(b) sets forth the employers that

140. Id. Representative Goodling recognized the fact that Congress amended the
ADEA in 1984 to allow the Act extraterritorial reach. He also noted that the House
widely supported the amendment. Id.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
142. S. REP. No. 98-467, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1984). The report stated that,
"the purpose behind the amendment is to insure that the citizens of the United States
who are employed in a foreign workplace by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries
enjoy the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." Id. at 27.
143. Id. at 27-28.
144. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109 (1991).
145. Id. § 109(a). This section also adds the same language to the definition of
employee in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
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are exempt from the amendment. If complying with Title VII would
cause an employer to violate the laws of the foreign country, the employer will be exempt from Title VII's penalties. 146 Specifically, section
109(b) provides that:
It shall not be unlawful under § 703 or 704 for an employer (or
a corporation controlled by an employer), labor organization,
employment agency, or joint labor management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including
on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section
would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the
foreign country in which such workplace is located.14 7
Finally, section 109 provides that, "if an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice
prohibited by [the Act] engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer."' 4 8 This section determines
whether an employer controls a corporation based on "the interrelations of operations, the common management, the centralized control of
labor relations, and the common ownership or financial control."' 4 9

IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL AMENDMENTS TO

TITLE VII

The "Protection of Extraterritorial Employment Amendments"
provide the clear and expressed Congressional intent that the Aramco
court required from Congress. By enacting the extraterritorial amend-

ments, Congress has provided the answers to many of the questions
that the Supreme Court generated in Aramco. Thus, the American fe-

male employee who is sexually harassed overseas now can bring suit in
the United States against her American employer. Aramco, however,
still seems to require that federal courts apply the strict rule of construction - the presumption against extraterritoriality - to other

Congressional statutes. Consequently, federal courts cannot hold that a

146. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(b)(1)(B) (1991).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 109(c)(1).
149. Id. § 3(A), (B), (C), (D). These factors are common law agency requirements. See Street, supra note 54, at 380-81.
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federal statute extends extraterritorially, unless Congress explicitly authorizes such reach.
The extraterritorial amendments do not protect all Americans who
work for American companies abroad. The amendments expressly exempt those employers that would violate a foreign country's law by
complying with Title VII's prohibitions. 150 As stated above, in its committee report on the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. explained that the
policy behind such an exemption was to avoid conflicts with a foreign
country's laws. 5 Moreover, this exemption is consistent with federal
court decisions that have deferred to foreign law when the enforcement
of U.S. discrimination law caused a direct conflict with a foreign
52
law.1
This international policy has the unfortunate effect of leaving some
American workers who work for American companies overseas without
Title VII protection. For example, if Kuwait prohibits women from
working in certain occupational fields, American employers that are
based in Kuwait could refuse to hire a woman in that particular field
simply because she is a woman. Of course, if that employer dared to
engage in such behavior in the United States, the woman would have a
strong Title VII suit against the employer. Another example is a black
American employee whose company transfers him to South Africa. If
South Africa prohibits blacks from working in the company's particular field, the company could fire him simply because of his race. 53
What would happen if the company transfers the employee to South
Africa knowing that it could fire him in South Africa without being
subject to a Title VII suit? According to the amendments, the em-

150. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(b) (1991).
151. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
152. See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(Saudia Arabian law that prohibited non-Moslem pilots from flying into Mecca justified Dynalectron's requirement that American pilots must convert to the Moslem religion), affid, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1981); see also David M. Barbash, Note, Same
Boss, Different Rules: An Argument for ExtraterritorialExtension of Title VII to
Protect U.S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. MultinationalCorporations, 30 VA.
J. INT'L L. 479, 509 (1990) (advocating for the extraterritorial extension of Title VII).
153. For example, the Bantu Building Workers Act prohibits blacks from performing skilled work in the building trade and makes it a criminal offense to employ
blacks in such work. 1951 Stat. S. Afr. No 27 § 14, 15. For a further discussion on
South African law, see Brian J. F. Clark, Note, United States Labor Practices In
South Africa: Will A Mandatory Fair Employment Code Succeed Where Sullivan
Principles Have Failed?, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 358, 376-77 (1984) [hereinafter
Clark].
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ployee would have no remedy under Title VII. 5 4 The American company, however, may be subject to the foreign country's employment
discrimination laws. If so, the employee may have a remedy against the
1 55
American company in the court system of the foreign country.
Overall, the extraterritorial amendments provide significant Title
VII protection to a great number of American citizens who work overseas for American companies. Unfortunately, because the amendments
only protect conduct that occurs after the Act's enactment, 1 6 people
such as Boureslan still have no Title VII remedy for their employer's
alleged discriminatory acts.
In order to avoid being sued in American courts, American companies that operate abroad and employ American citizens will have to
conform their employment policies to adhere to Title VII. Because the
extraterritorial amendments do not apply to foreign employees who
work for American companies abroad,15 7 American companies can lawfully apply discriminatory policies against these foreign employees. An
American company will have to decide if it will, in fact, adhere to its
discriminatory policies against its foreign employees or if the company
will treat the foreign employees as it now must treat its American employees. As stated above, however, the foreign country may protect the
foreign employee with its own employment discrimination laws. 158
Finally, the extraterritorial amendments may potentially cause an
increase in civil rights litigation. In general, Congress designed the
1991 Civil Rights Act to increase litigation. 59 The 1991 Act allows for
jury trials, compensatory and punitive damages, and relaxes the plaintiff's burden of proof in disparate-impact cases.' e0 An increase in civil

154. The employee, however, may have other remedies in American courts such as
breach of contract. In the past, Congress has attempted to pass legislation that would
sanction American companies who discriminated against blacks in South Africa. Id. at
358-60. For example, in 1983, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) introduced the Labor
Standards Act, H.R. 3231, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983), which would have required
American companies doing business in South Africa to adhere to fair labor standards.
See also Clark, supra note 153, at 358-60.
155. For example, Italy prohibits employment discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, sex, marital status, political activities, and union activities. ITALIAN
CONST. art. 4 (1948); see also 4 SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER & GERALDSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES 360 (1970).
156. Pub. L. No 102-166, § 109(c) (1991).
157. See S. REP. No. 98-467, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27-28 (1984).
158. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159. See Deborah Martin-Norcross & Pamela S. Poff, 1991 Civil Rights Act
Makes Sweeping Shifts, N.J. L. J. Dec. 7, 1991, at 7.
160. Id. Disparate impact results when an employment practice or policy is neutral on its face, but disproportionately or adversely affects minorities or women. Id.

168 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 16
rights litigation due to the extraterritorial amendments, therefore,
would seem consistent with the overall effect of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. The increase in extraterritorial claims, however, will probably be
lower than the increase in other civil rights claims. Before the amendments, the federal courts did not adjudicate many claims that required
extraterritorial application of Title VII. 6e' In addition, since Congress
amended the ADEA in 1984, federal courts have not reported any
cases that apply the extraterritorial amendments.162
V.

CONCLUSION

In its decisions denying the extraterritorial reach of the ADEA
and Title VII, the federal courts have twice warned Congress that if it
does not explicitly state whether a federal statute is to apply extraterritorially, the courts will apply a presumption against the statute's extraterritorial reach. In response to these decisions, Congress enacted Title
VII's extraterritorial amendments. In so doing, Congress expanded Title VII protection to a significant number of American citizens who
work overseas for American companies. Because the federal courts
have yet to apply the new extraterritorial amendments, it is difficult to
predict exactly how the amendments will impact civil rights litigation.
It is clear, however, that many American citizens who work overseas
for American companies can now be confident that Title VII will protect them against employer discrimination.
Rene S. Orleans

161. See generally Bryrant v. Int'l Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1982);
Love v. Pullman Co., 13 F.E.P. 423 (D. Colo. 1976); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986); Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex.
1987), aff'd 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), affd 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir 1990)(en
bane), affid sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
162. As of this writing, the author has found no such cases through any LEXIS
searches.

